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THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT AND THE
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
IN THE YEAR 1954
WmLiTA H. BECKER*
This discussion supplements the previous articles on the same sub-
ject, the last of which was published in 19 Missouri Law Review at page
48, and included the cases reported in 260 Southwestern Reporter,
Second Series. This article closes with the cases reported in 269 South-
western Reporter, Second Series.
During 1954, the Supreme Court continued to use the terms
"humanitarian doctrine", "humanitarian rule", and "humanitarian negli-
gence" to comprehend the common law last clear chance rule and the
unique Missouri extension of the last clear chance rule.
The typical common law last clear chance cases which are recognized
in other jurisdictions are as follows:
"Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 1:
"The peril to plaintiff's person, property, or both results
from physical helplessness caused by plaintiff's lack of care.
Defendant actually discovers the peril in time, thereafter, with
safety to himself, to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise of
care. This is a simple last clear chance case. The plaintiff may
recover for personal injury and property damage despite his
negligence in practically all common law jurisdictions. This
result is well settled in Missouri and not expected to be challeng-
ed; but this is not a humanitarian negligence case.
"Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 2:
"The facts are the same as in Case 1, except that the defend-
ant does not actually discover the peril, but in the exercise of
care he should have discovered it in time to avoid damage, by the
exercise of care and with safety to himself. As in Case 1, a
majority of courts permit plaintiff to recover for personal injury
or property damage under the last clear chance rule. This is not
a humanitarian negligence case, and the rule is not expected to
be challenged.
*Attorney, Columbia. LL3B., University of Mlissouri, 1932.
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"Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 3:
"The peril to plaintiff's person, property or both, results
from plaintiff's negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness in Mis-
souri judicial parlance). Defendant (as in Case 1) actually dis-
covers the peril in time, thereafter, to avoid damage to plaintiff
by the exercise of care. This is a last clear chance case. It is not
a humanitarian case. The rule that plaintiff may recover seems
settled in Missouri and elsewhere. There appears to be no se-
rious challenge to the soundness of the right to plaintiff to re-
cover in this case."
Under the general designation "humanitarian doctrine", the Mis-
souri courts have recognized all three common law last clear chance
cases and have added a fourth type of case wherein the injured party
may recover despite his contributory negligence. This fourth type of
case, which is the unique humanitarian case is as follows:
True Humanitarian Case No. 4:
The injured person is in a position of imminent peril as a
result of his negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness). The in-
jured party could extricate himself from his peril by his own
efforts, if he were aware of his peril and used care. The defend-
ant or party against whom claim for damages is made does not
actually discover the peril of the injured party. Nevertheless, in
the exercise of care the party causing injury should have dis-
covered the peril in time thereafter with safety to himself by the
use of care to have avoided injury to the plaintiff. In other words
the party causing injury is also negligently inattentive (obliv-
ious). The Missouri courts permit recovery by the injured party
in this case; and in this respect are more liberal in permitting
recovery than courts of other jurisdictions.
Attention is again invited to the fact that under the unique Mis-
souri humanitarian doctrine, Case No. 4, both plaintiff and defendant
can make cases simultaneously for recovery, each against the other,
upon a single assumed version of the facts, provided both parties suffer
personal injuries.
At the close of 1954, the two most perplexing questions concerning
the true humanitarian doctrine remained unanswered. These questions
are:
Can both plaintiff and defendant recover from each other simul-
taneously under the true humanitarian doctrine?
1955]
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Is humanitarian negligence of the plaintiff, of the same quality and
timing as that of the defendant, a defense to plaintiff's recovery under
the humanitarian doctrine?
In connection with these questions it should be noted they do not
arise under common law last clear chance cases No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3,
because it is impossible for the plaintiff and the defendant to make cases
against each other under any single assumed version of the facts.
The common law rule of contributory negligence which defeats
recovery regardless of the relative degree of fault between plaintiff and
defendant has been generally regarded as a harsh rule. Various devices,
judicial and statutory, have been created to lessen the harshness of the
contributory negligence rule. The common law last clear chance rule is
a judicial device. The statutory and constitutional enactments abolishing
contributory negligence as a defense are examples of the nonjudicial
approach. The comparative negligence rule and the proportional fault
rules are other variations.
Since the humanitarian doctrine in Missouri does not logically fit
into a system of recovery based on fault, and since the advent of auto-
mobiles, it became increasingly difficult for the courts to administer,
there has been some sentiment for a restriction of the rule by judicial
decision. Although the humanitarian rule is "judge made" law, the
Supreme Court has not yet taken any action to restrict the rule.
In 1953, opponents of the rule caused to be introduced Senate Bill
106, which had as its objective abolition of the humanitarian rule and
also of the common law rule of recovery in last clear chance case No. 3.
The text of the bill was as follows:
"The 'Humanitarian Doctrine' in negligence actions, as now
recognized by the courts in Missouri, is hereby limited and con-
fined to those cases wherein, and during the time, the plaintiff,
the person injured or killed, or the property involved, is in a
position of helpless or inescapable peril."
The Missouri Senate failed to report the bill for action.
The agitation for repeal of the humanitarian doctrine by legislative
act produced a counter-action from those favoring the abolition of contri-
butory negligence as a defense. As a result there has been introduced
in the 1955 Legislature Senate Bill No. 144, which would substitute by
3
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statute the rule of comparative negligence for the contributory negligence
rule. This bill reads as follows:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allow-
ed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering."
Many variations, by committee substitute and by amendment, are
possible. The initiative in regard to the change in the existing law seems
to have passed from defendant's representatives to the claimant's rep-
resentatives.
THE Missoui SuPREmE COURT IN 1954
The Missouri Supreme Court in 1954 seemed to be concerned prin-
cipally with questions regarding instructions, the submissibility of cases,
and the disposition of reversed cases on appeal insofar as the humanitar-
ian doctrine is concerned.
The opinions of the court continued to be of improved quality and
showed laborious and painstaking efforts in the analyses of complicated
fact situations.
In the period covered no case before the court afforded an opportu-
nity for any fundamental action regarding the perplexing questions men-
tioned earlier in this article.
THE COURT EN BAxc
Paydon v. Globus' reviews an opinion of the St. Louis Court of
Appeals.2 This case involved a midday collision between two meeting
automobiles travelling in opposite directions. The automobile in which
plaintiff was riding struck an icy spot on the hghway, proceeded some 72
feet onward in plaintiff's right hand lane and then abruptly turned across
the highway into the defendant's right hand lane where it was struck.
The Missouri Supreme Court in an opinion by Judge Tipton, applied
previously declared rules in holding that no submissible case of humani-
1. 262 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1953).
2. Paydon v. Globus, 255 S.W2d 61 (Mo. App. 1953).
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tarian negligence was made. The earlier opinion of the St. Louis Court
of Appeals in the same case, by the late lamented and always respected
Judge Walter Bennick, was affirmed. This was a typical case illustrating
the difficulty in making a submissible case of humanitarian negligence
without eyewitness evidence of facts placing the plaintiff in a position
of certain danger in time for the defendant to avoid the injury by the
exercise of care.
DeLay v. Ward3 involved a true humanitarian Case No. 4 situation.
The plaintiff was a three year old child struck one afternoon by defend-
ant's automobile when the child had nearly completed a dash across the
highway in front of defendant's car. The case was submitted on failure
to slacken, swerve, or warn under the humanitarian doctrine.
The Springfield Court of Appeals in the same case 4 held that no
submissible humanitarian case was made. In so holding the court of
appeals limited the defendant's duty under the humanitarian doctrine to
a situation in which the defendant was aware of plaintiff's peril. This
holding was rejected by the supreme court en bane in an opinion by
Judge Dalton. Judge Dalton undertook a laborious study of the record
and reconstructed the situation from the inferences and evidence most
favorable to the plaintiff child, supplemented by matters of judicial
notice. This case is notable for its minute consideration of the evidence
and the deductions and calculations from known facts. It should be
compared with Vietmeier v. Voss,5 wherein recovery was denied. The
difference in result in this case is based on the difference in facts of the
two cases.
DIVIsIoN NUMiBER ONE
Hayes v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of St. Louis6 was a suit by a
street car motorman against a truck operator for personal injuries sus-
tained by the motorman in a headon collision as the streetcar turned on
a curved track into the path of the oncoming truck. The case was sub-
mitted on the humanitarian doctrine as a case of discovered or discover-
able peril resulting from plaintiff's physical helplessness (last clear
chance case No. 1 or No. 2). Applying settled principles to the evidence
3. 262 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. 1953).
4. 262 S.W.2d 626 (Mo. App. 1953).
5. 246 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1952).
6. 269 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. 1954).
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and inferences most favorable to the plaintiff, Judge Hyde held that a
humanitarian case was made. The case was close but calculations from
the evidence were held to make a case of failure to stop and failure to
swerve. The case was difficult to handle on appeal because of incon-
sistent estimates of speed and distance of plaintiff and his witnesses, but
the court in keeping with settled rules relied on inferences and estimates
most favorable to the defendant.
Johnson v. Cox7 was an action for wrongful death arising out of a
head on collision at night between an automobile and a motorcycle
operated by plaintiff's decedent husband. The defendant was making a
left turn across a public highway to reach a parking lot on her left side
of the highway. When the defendant's automobile was five feet across
the center line, the motorcycle without lights and travelling forty-eight
miles per hour suddenly collided with the front center of the automobile
of the defendant, according to defendant, the only surviving eyewitness.
Plaintiff's case was submitted on failure to stop or swerve under the
humanitarian doctrine. The jury's verdict under the lower court's judg-
ment was for the defendant.
On appeal, in an opinion by Judge Hyde, the judgment was reversed
for error in giving the following "sole cause" instruction:
"The Court instructs the jury that if you find and believe
from the evidence that Marvin Johnson, deceased, on the oc-
casion described in the evidence, operated the motorcycle as
described in the evidence, at a time after dark without a lighted
headlight, or at a rate of speed of approximately 45 to 50 miles
per hour, and if you further find that such rate of speed, if
any, was high, dangerous and excessive, and if you further find
and believe that such act or acts, if any, constituted negligence
and were the sole cause of the collision described in the evidence,
and that defendant was not guilty of negligence as submitted in
favor of the defendant, Lovie Cox."
This instruction was held to be erroenous (1) for failing to hypothe-
size facts "from which a jury could find that deceased's negligence was
the sole proximate cause of the collision" and (2) for being confusing,
misleading, and tending to divert attention from the humanitarian issue.
Further, the court held that under the record there were no facts in
evidence to justify a proper sole cause instruction, and (unless further
7. 262 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1953).
19551
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facts appeared) on re-trial defendant's instruction should be a converse
instruction, negativing some essential fact of the humanitarian case sub-
mitted by plaintiff.
This case, in passing on the form of the "sole cause" instruction is
indicative of the tendency toward limitation of the use of the "sole
cause" instruction in humanitarian cases. In 1950, the instruction barely
survived Janssens v. Thompson.8 With the personnel of the court chang-
ing from time to time it is not inconceivable that the minority opinion
in the Janssens case may become the majorty opinion in the future.
Meanwhile, the practitioner will use the "sole cause" instruction with
caution and with the knowledge that it may be repudiated and abolished
in some case yet to be decided.
This was a last clear chance, No. 2, or a true humanitarian case,
number four in the alternative.
Caswell v. St. Louis Public Service Co.9 involved the striking of
an automobile in the rear by a swifter moving overtaking streetcar in
the daytime. The case was submitted upon failure of the streetcar opera-
tion to slacken under the humanitarian doctrine. The submissibility of
the humanitarian case and plaintiff's main instruction was upheld. The
opinion by Judge Hollingsworth involves the application of previously
declared principles. It is remarkable for a painstaking review of the
facts, characteristic of the recent opinions of the court. This was a last
clear chance case No. 3 or a humanitarian case No. 4.
Sauer v. Winkler ° grew out of a collision between motor vehicles
proceeding in opposite directions at or near an intersection of two high-
ways. Plaintiff's case was submitted on primary and humanitarian
negligence. On plaintiff's appeal from an adverse verdict, the court in an
opinion by Judge Coil, held that a converse humanitarian instruction,
given at the request of the defendant, which instructon directed a verdict
for the defendant, and ignored the submission of primary negligence,
was reversible error. There is dictum in the case taking a very tolerant
view of the defendant's separate instruction on contributory primary
negligence of the plaintiff which ignored the humanitaran negligence
submission. This was a last clear chance case No. 1 or No. 2.
8. 228 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1950). See discussion in 17 Mo. L. Rv. 32, 1.c. 37-38
(19. 2
9. 262 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. 1953).
10. 263 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. 1954).
[Vol. 20
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Anderson v. Prugh" was a suit for personal injuries sustained by
plaintiff, a twelve year old child injured when a sled she was riding in
a village street collided with defendant's automobile in the forenoon near
the junction of the village street and a county highway on which defend-
ant was driving. The court in an opinion by Judge Dalton held that the
defendant could have discovered plaintiff in imminent peril in time to
stop, under the facts in evidence and permissible inferences favorable
to plaintiff. The interesting feature of the case is the absence of either
eyewitness witness or competent expert testimony of the speed of the
sled as it approached the intersection. Ordinarily, some competent evi-
dence of the speed of plaintiff as well as of defendant is required.
Plaintiff's case was submitted on defendant's humanitarian or last clear
chance negligence in failing to slacken speed and stop. The instruction
contained a preliminary definition of a motorist's duty to keep a vigilant
lookout. This preliminary definition was held to be erroneous because it
injects primary negligence of the defendant (occuring before imminent
peril of plaintiff arose) into the humanitarian submission. The con-
demned language of plaintiff's instruction is as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury that it was the duty of Benton
M. Prugh, while driving his automobile at the time and place
mentioned in evidence, to keep a vigilant look-out, both ahead
and to the sides, to discover other persons upon and approaching
the county road on which he was driving, and to use the highest
degree of care to avoid injuring such persons; therefore, you are
further instructed that if * * *".
Certain language of the opinion in Wilt v. Moody1 2 is sharply criti-
cized as confusing primary and humanitarian negligence. An opinion
of the court, en banc, reconciling the language of the Anderson case and
the Wilt case, or overruling one of them is needed. This was a last clear
chance case No. 2.
Breshears v. Myers1 3 involved a headon collision between two ap-
proaching and meeting passenger automobiles. Plaintiff was turning left
across the highway toward a service station on her left side of the road.
She never saw defendant's automobile which came fast over the crest
of a hill which for a time obscured it from view. The only estimate of
speed was defendant's estimate that his car was travelling sixty-five to
11. 264 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. 1954).
12. 254 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1953).
13. 266 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1954).
19551
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seventy miles per hour when plaintiff slowly turned across the highway.
The other evidence indicated that defendant's car was travelling at least
sixty-five to seventy miles per hour. Plaintiff introduced evidence of
defendant's ability to stop at sixty miles per hour but none at any other
speed. In an appeal by the plaintiff from an adverse verdict, the court
in an opinion by Judge Hyde, held that no submissible case was made
because there was no evidence of ability to stop at the speed defendant
was shown to be travelling.
In this case, defendant turned to his right and the collision occurred
near defendant's right side of the road. The evidence indicated that by
turning left the defendant could have avoided the collision. In holding
that the failure to turn left rather than right was not negligence the
court applied the rule of the case of Vietmeier v. Voss,14 holding the
defendant not negligent in choosing one of two possible courses of action
in an emergency. This is a defense or concept which will probably be
urged more and more since its emphasis in the Vietmeier case. The case
if submissible would have been a last clear chance case No. 3 or humani-
tarian case No. 4.
Ukman v. Hoover Motor Express Co.,1 5 was a suit for personal
injuries suffered by plaintiff when the station wagon he was driving
was struck by a truck at a city street intersection. The vehicles approach-
ed on collision courses at a right angle. On appeal by defendant from
an adverse verdict, Judge Coil wrote a model opinion reviewing the
evidence in detail and holding that a humanitarian case was made.
The opinion handles the mass of detail and the calculations justified by
the evidence logically and expertly. The principles applied are not new.
Nor is the fact situation unusual. But the technique of the opinion and
its economical but sufficient treatment of the material facts, inferences,
and legal principles could serve as a guide in preparing cases for trial
and in testing the submissibility of last clear chance and humanitarian
cases. As an example of the methodical and proper approach to applica-
tion of established rules to fact situations, the opinion is worth reading
by any practitioner in the negligence field. Because the plaintiff was
not apparently oblivious, but was physically helpless when peril arose,
the case is a true last clear chance case No. 1 or No. 2.
14. 246 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1952).
15. 269 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1954).
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Wapelhorst v. Lindner16 was an action for wrongful death of a nine
year old boy riding a bicycle who was struck and killed by defendant's
automobile at twilight on Manchester Road or U. S. Highway No. 50
in St. Louis County. On appeal, the plaintiff complained of the failure
of the trial court to submit the case on the humanitarian doctrine in
failing to swerve or to warn. The court affirmed the action of the trial
court, holding that the case was not submissible on the humanitarian
doctrine. The only eye witness to the collision was the defendant, whose
testimony and admissions construed most favorably to the plaintiff was
that the defendant first saw the deceased child when he was ten feet in
front of the defendant's automobile, which was travelling fifty miles per
hour. The court, in an opinion by Judge Lozier, held that the record
failed to show, directly or by inference, when or where the deceased
child came into a position of peril before he was within ten feet of the
automobile at which time his injury was unavoidable. This is one of
those difficult cases where the person injured is killed and is not avail-
able to testify, and the only eye witness is the defendant whose own
testimony fails to make a submissible case. There is no controversy
about the legal principles to be applied. Disposition of the appeal turned
upon the inferences to be drawn from the facts in evidence.
Largo v. Bonadonna 7 was a suit for personal injuries and property
damage sustained as a result of an intersectional collision between two
passenger automobiles at night in Kansas City. The case was submitted
by the plaintiff solely under the humanitarian doctrine for failure to
slacken, to stop, or to swerve. From an adverse verdict the plaintiff
appealed, assigning his error to the giving of defendant's instruction num-
ber 9, which read as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury that there was no duty resting
upon the defendants mentioned in evidence to have slackened
the speed of their automobile, or to have stopped said auto-
mobile, or to have turned the same aside until it became ap-
parent in the exercise of the highest degree of care on the part
of said defendants that the plaintiff was in a position of peril on
the street mentioned and described in evidence.
"So, therefore, if you find and believe from the evidence that
the defendants automobile was being driven in a northerly di-
rection on Troost Avenue, and that the plaintiff was driving his
16. 269 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1954).
17. 269 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1954).
1955]
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automobile in an easterly direction on 19th Street, and if you
further find and believe from the evidence that when the front
end of defendants automobile had reached the south curb lind of
19th Street that the plaintiff's automobile was some 10 feet west
of the west curb line of Troost Avenue, if you so find, and if you
further find and believe from the evidence that at said time
plaintiff was driving his automobile in excess of 35 miles per
hour, if you so find, and that the defendants automobile was pro-
ceeding at a speed of from 10 to 15 miles per hour, if you so find,
and if you further find and believe from the evidence that
plaintiff's automobile was driven into the intersection past the
stop sign for eastbound traffic on the west side of Troost Avenue,
if you so find, directly into the course of the automobile driven
by the defendants, if you so find, and if you further find and
believe from the evidence that plaintiff drove his automobile as
aforesaid in such close proximity to the defendants automobile
that by the exercise of the highest degree of care on the part of
the defendants that they were unable to slow up their auto-
mobile, stop the same, or turn aside in time thereafter to avoid
a collision with the automobile driven by the plaintiff, then you
are instructed that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover against
the defendants and your verdict shall be in favor of the defend-
ants."
The opinion written by Judge Van Osdol conceded that the instruc-
tion was erroneous and should not be used as a model in any case, but,
nevertheless, affirmed the judgment on the theory the errors in the
instruction were harmless. The reasoning of this opinion is that all errors
in verdict directing instructions are not reversible errors. There is much
that can be said for said reasoning, but it remains a fact at this time that
such reasoning is not consistently invoked in humanitarian cases. It should
be noted that the prevailing party in this case is the defendant and that
the court concluded there was no reversible error because "it would
seem clear that plaintiff failed to sustain his version of jury persuasion".
There remains the question whether a different rule concerning reversi-
ble error would be applied if the erroneous instruction were given by
the party sustaining the burden of proof.
DmsION NUMBER Two
Erickson v. Kansas City Public Service Co.18 involved an early
morning collision between an eastbound motorbus and a northwest bound
18. 265 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. 1954).
[Vol. 20
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passenger automobile at an oblique junction of a paved city street and a
paved county road. The pavement of both the street and highway were
wet. The plaintiff entering the intersection saw the bus 120 feet away
and accelerated her car to get out of its path. The bus driver put on
his brakes and skidded to his left striking plaintiff's car. The evidence
of both the plaintiff and the bus driver supported plaintiff's contention
that the collision would not have occurred if the bus driver had reduced
his speed and continued on his original course without skidding.
In an opinion by Judge Westhues it was held that a humanitarian
case was made. Here the defendant was aware of plaintiff's peril but
did the wrong thing attempting to avert it. Plaintiff was physically help-
less to avoid the collision. The case was held to be submissible on the
humanitarian doctrine for failure to slacken speed. This is a classic last
clear case No. 1.
East v. McMenamy' 9 grew out of a daytime collision on new High-
way U. S. No. 40 between a passenger car and a truck, both proceeding
eastwardly. The passenger car driven by plaintiff's husband who was
instantly killed, struck the truck from the rear as the truck driver turned
left at an intersecting highway junction. The plaintiff pleaded only the
humanitarian doctrine. The court in an opinion by Judge Tipton, pro-
perly held that no humanitarian case was made, thereby approving the
action of the trial court, which had directed a verdict for defendant.
But the court then proceeded, out of grace, to reverse and remand the
case to permit plaintiff to amend and plead primary negligence, on
retrial. This is quite a contrast to the theory of abandonment sometimes
invoked where plaintiff pleads and proves primary negligence but errone-
ously submits the case on unproved humanitarian negligence. Perhaps
this East case under discussion is evidence of an amelioration of the
doctrine of abandonment. Compare the opinion of Judge Conkling,
speaking for the court en banc and presumably settling rules relating to
abandonment of primary negligence, in Smith v. St. Louis Public Service
Co.20
Welch v. McNeely 21 was heard in Division No. 2 by a court composed
of one regular judge and Special Judges Stone and Dew, transferred
19. 266 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1954).
20. 259 S.W2d 692 (Mo. 1953).
21. 269 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. 1954).
1955]
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from the Springfield and Kansas City Courts of Appeal, respectively.
The opinion was written by Special Judge Stone. The case involved a
collision between two passenger automobiles on U. S. Highway No. 61
in the late afternoon. The plaintiff was attempting to drive his automobile
from a parking area on his left side of the highway across defendant's
traffic lane. A collision occured in the defendant's traffic lane. Plaintiff
claims that after he started across defendant's traffic lane and was in a
position of imminent peril, the defendant had ample time to stop and
avoid the collision but failed to do so. The defendant claimed that the
plaintiff from a position of safety off the highway, drove suddenly across
and in front of defendant's automobile so close in front thereof that
defendant had no time to stop. The case was submitted solely upon
humanitarian negligence in failing to stop. The jury returned a verdict
for the defendant. On appeal the supreme court, in an opinion by Special
Judge Stone, held that the giving of the following instruction on behalf
of the defendant was not error:
"The Court instructs you that if you believe and find that
at the time plaintiff's automobile entered a position of imminent
peril the defendant could not, by the exercise of the highest
degree of care, have prevented the collision by stopping his auto-
mobile, then, and in such event, plaintiff is not entitled to recover
on his cause of action and you will find your verdict in favor of
the defendant on plaintiff's cause of action."
The instruction was approved as a defense instruction, hypothesizing
the absence of one of the constitutive elements of the humanitarian doc-
trine in a case submitted solely on failure to stop.
CONCLUSION
It has been frequently repeated that the life of the law has not been
logic, but has been experience. So the Missouri humanitarian rule could
survive its lack of logic as a doctrine of relative fault, if in experience it
could be sustained on a utilitarian basis. The trouble is that on the basis
of experience, some of the problems flowing from it are without a logical
or practical solution. Now it appears that either the humanitarian doc-
trine must be restricted by judicial decision, or the harsh contributory
negligence rule of the common law must be abolished by legislation.
There is much to be said for each of the alternative remedies. There
is little that can be said for continuance of the existing dilemma.
13
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In this field of substantive law the legislature has an undoubted
constitutional right to act. At the same time, since the rule was created
by judicial decision, the supreme court likewise has a right to act when
an appropriate case comes before it. No one knows how and when this
problem will be solved. But it must be solved.
14
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